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Abstract
In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two objects scored higher on
a criterion. The first experiment was designed to contrast the prediction of Probabilistic Mental Model theory (Gigeren-
zer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) concerning sampling procedure with the hard-easy effect. The experiment failed to
support the theory’s prediction that a particular pair of randomly sampled item sets would differ in percentage correct;
but the observation that German participants performed practically as well on comparisons between U.S. cities (many
of which they did not even recognize) than on comparisons between German cities (about which they knew much more)
ultimately led to the formulation of the recognition heuristic. Experiment 2 was a second, this time successful, attempt to
unconfound item difficulty and sampling procedure. In Experiment 3, participants’ knowledge and recognition of each
city was elicited, and how often this could be used to make an inference was manipulated. Choices were consistent with
the recognition heuristic in about 80% of the cases when it discriminated and people had no additional knowledge about
the recognized city (and in about 90% when they had such knowledge). The frequency with which the heuristic could be
used affected the percentage correct, mean confidence, and overconfidence as predicted. The size of the reference class,
which was also manipulated, modified these effects in meaningful and theoretically important ways.
Keywords: recognition heuristic, reference class, probabilistic inference, overconfidence, hard-easy effect.
1 Introduction
The history of science and technology repeatedly demon-
strates that many laws are discovered and many inven-
tions are made serendipitously, as a by-product when re-
searchers are striving for something else. The recognition
heuristic is just one example of this: It was formulated as
a post-hoc explanation for a puzzling finding that was ob-
served while attempting to test a specific prediction of the
theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM; Gigeren-
zer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991). While the other
papers contained in this series of special issues and many
of the references given therein illustrate how stimulating
the formulation of the recognition heuristic was and how
much research it has spurred, the present paper turns back
the clock and reports three studies that were conducted in
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Hoffrage, 1995).1
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1It is embarrassing to say that I made no attempt to publish these
studies earlier, but I was determined to leave academia after I completed
my dissertation. When I revised my decision and returned, new and
exciting projects pushed me in other directions (see, e.g., Gigerenzer,
Todd, and the ABC Research Group, 1999).
This paper is organized as follows: The first part pro-
vides the historical context that led to the formulation
of the recognition heuristic. At the outset of this part,
a brief summary of PMM theory is given. Experiment
1 is then reported, which was conducted to address one
of the criticisms of the theory, namely the confounding
of sampling procedure and item difficulty. Specifically,
we compared over/underconfidence in two item sets that
were generated by the same sampling procedure but were
nevertheless supposed to differ with respect to percentage
correct. This attempt failed, yielding the counter-intuitive
finding that German participants performed about the
same when making comparisons between German cities
as when making comparisons between U.S. cities. Ex-
periment 2 reports a second, and this time successful, at-
tempt to unconfound item difficulty and sampling proce-
dure in order to answer the question that motivated Ex-
periment 1. The second part is also historical: It reports
Experiment 3, which provides, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the first empirical test of the recognition heuristic.
It was designed to find out whether the results obtained
in Experiment 1 could be explained by participants hav-
ing used the recognition heuristic. In this experiment, the
participants’ knowledge and recognition of each city was
elicited, and how often this could be used to make an in-
ference was manipulated. We also manipulated the in-
clusion criterion (and, in turn, the size) of the reference
class that the cities were drawn from when constructing
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the paired comparisons. The last part links the three “his-
torical” experiments to later studies and measures, and
discusses the theoretical relevance of the work described
here.
2 The historical context of the
recognition heuristic
2.1 The theory of Probabilistic Mental
Models
Independently, Gigerenzer et al. (1991) with their PMM
theory and Juslin (1994) developed what was later termed
“ecological models” (McClelland & Bolger, 1994).
When solving a task such as “Which city has more in-
habitants, A or B?” people construct a PMM (unless they
have direct knowledge or can deduce the answer with cer-
tainty, which we called a “local mental model”; Gigeren-
zer et al., 1991). By searching for probabilistic cues that
discriminate between the two alternatives, the question is
put into a larger context. Imagine that a search hits on
the soccer-team cue: City A has a soccer team in the ma-
jor league and City B does not. Based on the literature
on automatic frequency processing, PMM theory posits
that people are able to estimate the ecological validity of
cues (as long as the objects belong to their natural en-
vironment). This validity is defined by the relative fre-
quency of cases in the environment where the cue indi-
cates the correct answer, given that the cue discriminates.
For instance, the validity of the soccer-team cue is 90%
(in the complete set of paired comparisons of all German
cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants). If participants
choose the city to which the cue points and report the
cue validity as their confidence, they should be well cal-
ibrated. This, however, is true only if the cue validities
in the item sample reflect the cue validities in the popu-
lation. If researchers do not sample general-knowledge
questions randomly, but over-represent items in which
cue-based inferences would lead to wrong choices, over-
confidence will occur. Such overconfidence does not re-
flect fallible reasoning processes but is an artifact of the
way the experimenter sampled the stimuli and ultimately
misrepresented the cue-criterion relations in the ecology.
In two experiments, Gigerenzer et al. (1991) found ex-
actly this: overconfidence was observed for a set of se-
lected items, but disappeared when the objects that were
used in the paired comparisons were randomly sampled
from a defined reference class.
The theory can also account for the common finding
that average confidence judgments exceed average fre-
quency estimates (“How many of the last 50 items did
you answer correctly?”) by positing that different refer-
ence classes are used for the two kind of judgments (for
details, see Gigerenzer et al., 1991). When PMM theory
was first published we had a long list of criticisms and
open questions that, in turn, gave rise to a series of stud-
ies in which attempts were made to falsify the theory in a
true Popperian fashion.2
2.2 A failed attempt to unconfound sam-
pling procedure and item difficulty (Ex-
periment 1)
One of the established findings in research on overcon-
fidence is the hard-easy effect (Hoffrage, 2004; Lichten-
stein & Fischhoff, 1977) according to which overconfi-
dence covaries with item difficulty: Hard item sets (i.e.,
those with a percentage of correct answers of about 75%
or lower in a two-alternative forced-choice task) tend to
produce overconfidence, whereas easy sets (i.e., those
with a percentage correct of about 75% or higher) tend
to produce underconfidence.
One of the problems of PMM theory was the fact that
selected item sets turned out to be hard (e.g., for Experi-
ment 1 and 2 of Gigerenzer et al., 1991, percentage cor-
rect was 52.9 and 56.2, respectively), whereas represen-
tative item sets turned out to be relatively easy (71.7 and
75.3, respectively). Therefore, even though PMM the-
ory correctly predicted that overconfidence disappeared
for the representative sets while it could be observed for
the selected set, these findings could, at the same time, be
seen as just another example of the hard-easy effect. Hof-
frage (1995) tried to shed some light on this issue by com-
paring two item sets, each consisting of paired compar-
isons for which the objects were generated by the same,
representative, sampling procedure but the difficulty of
these sets still differed (see also Kilcher, 1991). If PMM
theory was correct, then overconfidence should disappear
in both sets, whereas the hard-easy effect would be ob-
served if there was overconfidence for the hard set, but
no overconfidence for the easy set.
2.2.1 Method
Participants were mainly students of the University of
Constance, Germany (n=56; 12 female, 44 male). Their
task was to (1) repeatedly select, in a series of paired
comparisons among cities, the city with more inhabitants,
and (2) indicate their confidence in the correctness of
their choices on a scale ranging from 50–100% in incre-
ments of 10%. Two item sets were used: comparisons
2Although I was very sceptical about PMM theory and preferred to
address these issues before publishing anything, the first author, Gerd
Gigerenzer, replied that this would take considerable time and at the
end I would probably have discovered more new questions than I had
answered. Moreover, he pointed out that science is a social process and
that others may want to join my attempt to falsify the theory—but this
requires that it is published first. He was, of course, correct.
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between U.S. cities and comparisons between German
cities. These item sets were constructed as follows: In
the first phase, the largest 75 U.S. and the largest 75 West
German cities (before Germany’s unification) were de-
termined. Second, a random set of 39 cities was selected,
and ranked according to population size. Third, two ranks
were randomly determined and this pair of ranks consti-
tuted both the first pair of German cities and the first pair
of U.S. cities. This procedure of randomly combining
German and U.S. cities simultaneously was repeated until
100 comparisons among German cities and 100 compar-
isons among U.S. cities (with matched ranks) were deter-
mined, with the constraint that no pair appeared twice in
the item set. Participants worked on both item sets, with
order counterbalanced between-participants.
2.2.2 Results
The two item sets had almost the same difficulty (per-
centage correct for the German cities: 75.7% and for the
U.S. cities: 76.0%). Mean confidence was higher for the
German cities (79.5% vs. 72.3%), and thus participants
were slightly overconfident for the German cities (3.8%),
and slightly underconfident for the U.S. cities (-3.7%). A
participant-specific analysis revealed the same tendency:
For the German (U.S.) cities, 39 (22) participants were
overconfident and 17 (44) were underconfident. A com-
parison between item sets within participants showed that
22 participants achieved a higher percentage of correct
answers for the German cities, 29 participants achieved a
higher percentage for the U.S. cities, and for the remain-
ing 5 participants these percentages were the same. In
contrast, for 51 participants, their mean confidence was
higher for the German cities, for 4 participants it was
higher for the U.S. cities, and for the remaining 1 par-
ticipant there was a tie. Moreover, for 48 participants the
overconfidence score (mean confidence minus percentage
correct) was higher for the German cities and for 8 par-
ticipants it was higher for the U.S. cities (no ties).
2.2.3 Discussion
We expected that Germans would perform much better
on the German city comparisons than on the U.S. city
comparisons. Therefore, the main finding that item dif-
ficulty was practically the same for the two sets came as
a complete surprise to us, which gave rise to two ques-
tions. First, how else could the original intention, namely
to unconfound sampling procedure and item difficulty be
achieved? And, second, how could the striking result of
Experiment 1 be explained? I continue this report with
the experiment that addressed the first of these questions.
2.3 A successful attempt to unconfound
sampling procedure and item difficulty
(Experiment 2)
This study was a second attempt to unconfound sampling
procedure and item difficulty (Hoffrage, 1995, Exp. 5).
In Experiment 1, I tried to achieve this by using two dif-
ferent item sets (German vs. U.S. cities), each consist-
ing of comparisons that had to be made with respect to
the same criterion (number of inhabitants). In Experi-
ment 2, in contrast, I used only one reference class—
famous people—but two different criteria: Age at time
of death (“Who lived to be older?”), and time of birth
(“Who was born earlier?”). It was expected that the age
questions were relatively hard (think of Plato vs. Albert
Einstein) and that the birth questions were much easier
(again, think of Plato vs. Einstein).
2.3.1 Method
Participants were 100 students from the University of
Salzburg (31 male, 69 female). Comparisons were gener-
ated from a list of 286 famous names (for details, see Hof-
frage, 1995). The criterion (age vs. birth questions) was
manipulated within-participants, each of the two item sets
consisted of 100 comparisons, and order was counterbal-
anced.3
2.3.2 Results and discussion
As expected, the age questions were much harder than
the birth questions (percentage correct = 57.1 and 73.5,
respectively, t99=21.3, p<.001). Mean confidence was
much lower for the age questions (62.3% compared to
76.8% for the birth questions, t99=17.7, p<.001). Partic-
ipants were slightly overconfident, both for the age and
the birth questions (5.2% and 3.3%, respectively). Even
though this difference of 1.9 percentage points was sta-
tistically significant (t99=1.99, p=.049), it was obtained
with 100 participants in a within-participants design, and
cannot be considered as substantial, in fact, the effect size
of question type was small to medium (d=.4).
3Three more variables were manipulated between-subjects. First,
half of the participants experienced the sampling procedure (they drew
the names in the pairs from an urn themselves), while the other half
were not told how the pairs were generated. Second, 80 participants
were asked to specify the subjective probability that they had answered
the last comparison correctly, while the other 20 were asked to specify
the probability that their answer was wrong. Third, after every 10 items,
70 participants were asked “How many of the last 10 comparisons do
you think you answered correctly?”, while the other 30 were asked to
estimate the number of items they got wrong. Moreover, at the end of
every item set, participants estimated the total number of correct (or
wrong) answers (out of 100 age/birth questions). While Experiment
2 was included in this paper because it is a direct consequence from
Experiment 1, all variables listed in the present footnote were omitted
for space reasons (for more information, see Hoffrage, 1995, or contact
the author).
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This time the attempt to generate two item sets through
the same sampling procedure that differed with respect
to percentage correct was successful. Even though
there was slightly more overconfidence for the harder
set (5.2%) than for the easier set (3.3%), the absolute
difference was miniscule compared to the numbers in
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff’s (1977) paper on the hard-
easy effect. Moreover, the hard set had a percentage
correct of 57.1% (compared to 73.5% for the easy set),
which suggests that for the harder set, scale-end effects
(Juslin, Wennerholm, & Olsson, 1999) and unsystem-
atic error (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Juslin &
Olsson, 1997; Juslin, Olsson, & Björkman, 1997) con-
tributed more to overconfidence than was the case for the
easier set.
3 First empirical test of the recogni-
tion heuristic (Experiment 3)
Soon after the data of Experiment 1 were analyzed, we
moved to the University of Salzburg. When we told our
new colleagues about this puzzling result, one of them,
Anton Kühberger, just repeated what we said, namely that
“the participants had not even heard of many of the Amer-
ican cities” (see also the introduction of Gigerenzer and
Goldstein, 2011). He then turned our own words into an
explanation that we ourselves had not seen as such and
that has, since then, been referred to as the recognition
heuristic. He pointed out that this partial lack of knowl-
edge was not an obstacle but something that the German
students could exploit. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)
later formulated the recognition heuristic as follows: “If
one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then
infer that the recognized object has the higher value with
respect to the criterion” (p. 76).
The data from the Experiment 1 could not be used to
test this post-hoc recognition explanation and so the fol-
lowing study was designed to determine whether peo-
ple used the recognition heuristic when making infer-
ences about city populations (Hoffrage, 1995; see also
Schmuck, 1993). We first determined which cities a par-
ticipant recognized and then manipulated how often the
recognition heuristic could be used. In addition, we ma-
nipulated the size of the reference class to test whether,
as explained below, this affected the participants’ confi-
dence judgments.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Participants were 60 students from the University of
Salzburg, Austria (30 male, 30 female).
3.1.2 Design and materials
For each of the 100 pairs of U.S. cities that the partic-
ipants saw, they had to select the city with more inhabi-
tants and then give a confidence judgment. For half of the
participants, the cities were taken from the set of all cities
with more than 200,000 inhabitants, and for the rest, from
all cities with more than 400,000 inhabitants. This fac-
tor is henceforth referred to as the size of the reference
class, having a value of either 75 or 32 cities, respec-
tively. It is important to note that the size refers to the
number of objects with a criterion value that is higher
than a specific threshold. Comparing the performance for
a reference class of 75 cities, randomly drawn from the
100 largest cities, to the performance for a reference class
of 32 cities, randomly drawn from the 100 largest cities,
would not be instrumental to test the predictions concern-
ing size of reference class laid out below. The second fac-
tor that was manipulated between-subjects was how often
participants’ knowledge discriminated between the cities,
henceforth referred to as the discrimination rate, with the
levels of high, low, and uncontrolled. These two factors
were fully crossed and 10 participants were randomly as-
signed to each of the resulting six conditions.
3.1.3 Procedure
The 40 participants who were assigned to either the high
or low discrimination-rate conditions were informed that
they were now “presented with a list of some Amer-
ican cities”. These were either the largest 32 or the
largest 75 cities (manipulated between-participants, see
above). The cities appeared in alphabetic order, and par-
ticipants were asked to indicate, for each city, whether
they (1) “know something about the city, that is, know
more than just the name” (henceforth referred to as K,
for more Knowledge), (2) “have heard the name of the
city, but have no knowledge beyond that” (R, for Recog-
nized name), and (3) “know nothing about the city and
have not even heard its name” (U, for Unrecognized).
These categorizations made it possible to generate six
different types of pairs. As can be seen in Table 1, the
number of pairs of a particular type differed between the
discrimination-rate conditions. Specifically, for partici-
pants in the high discrimination-rate condition, the cities
were combined such that the recognition heuristic could
be used in 55 of the 100 comparisons (25 K-U and 30 R-U
comparisons). In addition, there were 5 K-K comparisons
and 30 K-R comparisons for which eventually some other
knowledge could allow for an inference. Thus, depending
on what this other knowledge was, there was a minimum
of 55 and a maximum of 90 comparisons for which either
recognition or other knowledge discriminated. In con-
trast, for the low discrimination-rate condition, the mini-
mum was 25 (5 K-U + 20 R-U) and the maximum was 50
(all except 30 R-R and 20 U-U).
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Table 1: Types of paired comparisons and their frequencies. Frequencies in the high and low discrimination-rate
conditions were manipulated, and those of the uncontrolled discrimination-rate condition were empirically observed.
“Uncontrolled” refers to the distribution of paired comparison types for the 20 participants assigned to this condition,
and Uncontrolled-32 and Uncontrolled-75 refers to the distributions that resulted for the two sizes of the reference
class. K, R, and U denote cities, for which more Knowledge was available, which were merely Recognized, and which
were Unrecognized, respectively.
Discrimination rate Homogeneous types Heterogeneous types
K-K R-R U-U K-U K-R R-U
High 5 5 5 25 30 30
Low 5 30 20 5 20 20
Uncontrolled 15.0 22.6 4.0 11.7 31.5 15.4
Uncontrolled-32 15.7 30.0 0.7 6.3 35.9 11.4
Uncontrolled-75 14.2 15.1 7.2 17.0 27.1 19.4
After a participant finished his or her recognition judg-
ments, the computer program generated comparisons by
randomly selecting two cities. The frequency distribution
for the possible comparison types depended on the condi-
tion, as displayed in Table 1. (If, for a given participant,
this requirement could not be met, the software stopped
and this participant was excluded from the experiment).
Another constraint was that no pair was presented twice.
Then, the 100 comparisons were randomly ordered and
participants chose, for each pair, the city with more in-
habitants and indicated their subjective confidence in the
correctness of their choice.
The 20 participants who were assigned to the un-
controlled discrimination-rate condition started with 100
paired comparisons that were generated with the only
constraint that no pair was presented twice. For these
participants, recognition judgments were elicited after the
comparison phase.
Finally, participants estimated several relative frequen-
cies. First, for each of the three heterogeneous compar-
isons, they estimated the accuracy of inferences made for
these comparison types. For the R-U comparisons, for
instance, the instructions read “For all possible compar-
isons among cities for which you recognized one (but
have no more knowledge about it), and have not heard
of the other, what do you think is the percentage of com-
parisons for which the cities you recognized is the larger
one?” Second, they estimated their own percentage of
correct inferences for each of the six comparison types.
3.2 Predictions
3.2.1 Discrimination rate
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) extended Gigerenzer et
al.’s (1991) PMM algorithm by adding the recognition
heuristic, while preserving the principle of one-reason
decision making. This results in the following possible
situations. When the recognition heuristic discriminates
between two objects (cities in this case), then the city that
is recognized is chosen as the larger one and the recogni-
tion validity is given as the confidence level. When both
cities are recognized and something is known about at
least one of the cities, the most valid cue is used to make
a choice and the confidence is determined by the valid-
ity of this cue. When both cities are recognized but no
further knowledge is available, or when neither city is
recognized, a city is chosen randomly and confidence is
50%. If cue validities and recognition validity are esti-
mated without any bias, confidence judgments should be
well calibrated and mean percentage correct should equal
mean confidence. This is because, within each of the six
comparison types, the city pairs were selected randomly
so that the validity of the cue and the recognition valid-
ity in the sample used in the experiment were expected
to be identical to those in the reference class. The fac-
tor of discrimination rate should thus affect only mean
percentage correct (higher in the high discrimination-rate
condition) and mean confidence (again, higher in the high
discrimination-rate condition), but it should not affect
overconfidence (the difference between confidence and
percentage correct).
3.2.2 Size of reference class
The size of the reference class was neither an issue in
the original PMM paper, nor in Gigerenzer and Goldstein
(1996), nor in Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999). It was
simply assumed that people are well adapted to their nat-
ural environments, and that they are able to estimate cue
validities with a reasonable degree of accuracy. However,
as Hoffrage (1995) and Hoffrage and Hertwig (2006)
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showed, cue validities can depend on the size of the refer-
ence class (see also Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, Figure
5). Gigerenzer et al. (1991) used all German cities with
more than 100,000 inhabitants (as of 1988). Although
100,000 is a salient number, other thresholds might have
been used. Indeed, the cue validities in this environment
depend on this threshold, that is, on the minimum num-
ber of inhabitants a city must have to be included in the
set. Across four different thresholds, cue validities varied
widely: For one of the twelve cues, the validity dropped
from 77% to 0%; for the others, the average absolute dif-
ference between the validities among all cities with more
than 100,000 inhabitants and those among all cities with
more than 300,000 was 10.3%.
In a similar vein, Juslin, Olsson and Winman (1998)
showed that the percentage of correct inference depends
on how items are sampled from a reference class. These
authors varied whether pairs were constructed by ran-
domly drawing each of the two objects from the whole
reference class or whether sampling was constrained such
that one (the other) object was randomly drawn from the
set of those objects with a criterion value above (below)
the median. The commonality between their constrained
sampling procedure and my larger reference class is that
for both conditions the differences between ranks (of ob-
jects with respect to the criterion value) are, on average,
larger compared to the corresponding rank differences
in the unconstrained procedure and the smaller reference
class, respectively. Juslin et al. (1998) found, both with
simulated and with participants’ data, that cue validities
and percentage correct, respectively, were positively re-
lated to averaged rank size differences.
Based on Juslin et al.’s findings and on my own calcula-
tions just reported, one would predict that the percentage
of correct inferences would be higher for the larger ref-
erence class. Given PMM Theory’s assumption that cue
validities drive not only percentage correct but also con-
fidence, one should predict that mean confidence would
be higher for the larger reference class as well. However,
based on the assumption that participants are not aware of
the relationship between (recognition and other cues’) va-
lidities and the size of the reference class—note that not
even the authors of PMM theory saw this when they pub-
lished their paper (Gigerenzer et al., 1991)—I predicted
that the mean confidence would not differ between the
two reference class conditions. Confidence could even
be higher for the smaller reference class. This is be-
cause, for this reference class, participants will presum-
ably recognize a higher proportion of cities and will know
more about a higher proportion of cities, compared to the
larger reference class condition. This overall impression
of higher familiarity with the cities may translate into
higher confidence judgments.4 Given the data of Experi-
4See Schooler & Hertwig, 2005, for another, more fine-grained, way
ment 1, which used U.S. cities above 200,000 inhabitants,
I expected that mean confidence would match percentage
correct and that there would thus be no overconfidence for
the larger reference class (largest 75 cities). In contract,
I predicted overconfidence for the smaller reference class
(largest 32 cities)—certainly because percentage correct
would be lower than for the larger reference class and
maybe, in addition, because mean confidence would be
higher than for the larger reference class.
Note that the combination of the uncontrolled
discrimination-rate condition with the two reference class
conditions is most likely to yield evidence conflicting
with PMM theory’s prediction that overconfidence dis-
appears if pairs are randomly sampled from a defined
reference class. (This prediction holds only for confi-
dence ratings, not for frequency estimates.) For the con-
trolled discrimination-rate condidions, analysing partici-
pants’ overconfidence is less crucial for a test of PMM
theory, as sampling of pairs is constrained in these condi-
tions.
3.3 Results
This section proceeds as follows. First, I report the ef-
fects of the two main factors, discrimination rate and size
of the reference class, on percentage correct, mean confi-
dence, and overconfidence. Second, I show that these ef-
fects were exclusively driven by the relative frequencies
of the six comparison types. Third, I ask how often partic-
ipants followed the recognition heuristic when selecting a
city. Fourth, I compare percentage correct and mean con-
fidence to estimated validities and estimated percentages
of correct choices. Finally, I demonstrate that recognition
judgments depended on the size of the reference class.
3.3.1 Main effects of discrimination rate and size of
the reference class
Figure 1 displays the six calibration curves for the six
conditions that result from crossing the two main fac-
tors: discrimination rate and size of the reference class.
Table 2 displays the mean confidence (MC), percentage
correct (PC), and overconfidence (OC = MC-PC), again,
across all participants and items. It can be seen that the
effect of discrimination rate was small compared to that
of the size of reference class. This is consistent with
the results of three ANOVAs, each computed with the
participant-specific values for MC, PC, and OC (Table 2,
lower rows). As predicted, for each of the correspond-
ing discrimination-rate conditions (e.g., high), PC was
higher for the larger reference class (e.g., 69.4) than for
the smaller one (e.g., 65.5), and MC was higher for the
to discriminate among cities beyond the dichotomous concept of recog-
nition.
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Figure 1: Calibration curves for each combination of size
of the reference class (largest 75 cities, largest 32 cities)
and discrimination rate (high, low, uncontrolled).
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smaller reference class that contained relatively more fa-
miliar cities. Further, as predicted, OC differed dramati-
cally between the reference classes. For the 75 cities with
more than 200,000 inhabitants, it basically disappeared,
replicating Experiment 1 which used the same reference
class. For the reference class of the largest 32 cities (each
city more than 400,000 inhabitants), however, massive
overconfidence was observed. The interaction between
size of reference class and discrimination rate was not sta-
tistically significant for any of the three dependent vari-
ables (not shown in Table 2).
3.3.2 Effect of discrimination rate and size of refer-
ence class within comparison type
The values for PC in Table 2 should differ between the
discrimination-rate conditions because the validities of
the recognition heuristic and that of other cues should
be different for the six comparison types, and because
the relative frequencies of these types were different for
the three levels of discrimination rate. For a given com-
parison type, however, the PC should not depend on
the discrimination-rate condition. To test for this in-
dependence, for each of the 60 participants, MC, PC
and OC were computed within each of the six com-
parison types. Based on the resulting 60*6=360 en-
tries, three ANOVAs were conducted, one for each of
the three dependent variables (these ANOVAs had only
349 degrees of freedom because for some participants
of the uncontrolled discrimination-rate condition there
were no entries for some comparison types). Unlike
Table 2: Mean confidence, percentage correct, and over-
confidence for the six conditions of Experiment 2 that re-
sulted from combining size of reference class (1st level)
with discrimination rate (2nd level).
Mean
confidence
Percentage
correct
Over-
confidence
Large reference class (largest 75 cities)
High 67.4 69.4 −2.0
Low 64.2 63.9 0.3
Uncontrolled 70.7 72.3 −1.6
Small reference class (largest 32 cities)
High 74.9 65.5 9.4
Low 68.1 58.2 9.9
Uncontrolled 73.6 61.5 12.1
Effect of size of reference class
F(1,54) 4.29 22.6 26.4
p .019 <.001 <.001
Effect of discrimination rate
F(2,54) 3.56 8.21 0.19
p .036 .001 .832
the previous analyses which were computed based on
averaging across all 100 items, when comparison type
was held constant, that is, statistically controlled for,
the discrimination rate no longer had an effect, MC:
F(2,349)=1.32, p=0.27, PC: F(2,349)=0.16, p=0.85, and
OC: F(2,349)=0.19, p=0.83. In contrast, the differ-
ences between the reference class conditions were signifi-
cant: MC: F(1,349)=12.70, p<0.001, PC: F(1,349)=8.60,
p=0.004, and OC: F(1,349)=32.37, p<0.001. Because
discrimination rate had, as expected, no significant effect
within a given comparison type (and its effect on MC,
PC, and OC across all 100 items was due only to different
frequencies of the different comparison types), the subse-
quent analyses focus on comparison types, thereby aggre-
gating across participants of the different discrimination-
rate conditions.
3.3.3 Effects of (recognition) knowledge on decisions
The results reported above establish that the frequency of
comparison types drove the percentage correct: The more
often the recognition heuristic could be used, the better
participants’ performance was. Even though this finding
already suggests that participants tended to infer that rec-
ognized cities are larger than unrecognized cities, there is
also a more direct way to see whether this was the case.
Table 3 displays—for each of the six comparison types
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Table 3: Mean confidence (MC), percentage correct (PC) and overconfidence (OC) for the six comparison types. For
the three heterogeneous types, cases were divided into those for which a participant’s decision matched the decision
of the recognition heuristic (“consistent”) or not (“inconsistent”), or favored a K-city over an R-city (“consistent”) or
not (“inconsistent”).
Comparison type Consistency with prediction N % MC PC OC
U-U 579 55.9 56.5 −0.6
R-R 1151 65.7 56.5 9.2
K-K 499 80.2 72.1 8.0
K-U consistent 759 91.1 79.9 83.6 −3.7
K-U inconsistent 74 8.9 61.4 21.2 40.2
K-U 833 100 78.4 78.6 −0.2
K-R consistent 1293 79.3 78.6 74.9 3.8
K-R inconsistent 337 20.7 64.5 48.5 16.0
K-R 1630 100 75.7 69.4 6.3
R-U consistent 1045 79.9 65.0 65.3 −0.3
R-U inconsistent 263 20.1 54.9 39.2 15.8
R-U 1308 100 63.0 60.0 3.0
and across all participants and items—mean confidence,
percentage correct and overconfidence. For the three het-
erogeneous comparison types an additional analysis was
performed, based on the knowledge about the two cities
and how a participant responded. Specifically, decisions
that were consistent with the assumption that the recog-
nition heuristic was used (referred to as “consistent”) in-
clude those where a city that was recognized (be it with
or without more knowledge, that is, a K-city or an R-city)
was selected when it was paired with an unrecognized
city. Finally, a decision in favor of a K-city when paired
with an R-city was also classified as “consistent”. Note
that for these cases, recognition did not discriminate, so
this classification was based on the assumption that more
knowledge about one city is most likely to be knowledge
that allows for the inference that it is larger than a city for
which such knowledge does not exist.
Across all cases in which a recognized city (either K
or R) was paired with an unrecognized city (U), partici-
pants decided in favor of the recognized city in 84.3% of
the cases. An analysis conducted on an individual basis
revealed that 5 participants decided in favor of the recog-
nized city in 100% of the critical cases, 11 in 99.9 - 90%
of the cases, 29 in 89.9 - 80%, 10 in 79.9 - 70%, 3 in 69.9
- 60%, 1 in 48% (this participant had a percentage correct
of 51%, suggesting that he responded randomly through-
out), and for 1 participant, the adherence rate could not
be computed (as she recognized all the cities in the refer-
ence class). When participants recognized both cities but
knew something about one city (K) but not the other (R),
they favored the city that they knew something about in
79.3% of the cases. It is interesting to see that such “con-
sistent” decisions were far more likely to be correct than
the “inconsistent” decisions. Had participants always de-
cided in favor of the recognized city (or, for K-R pairs,
in favor of the K city), the percentage correct for the K-
U, K-R, and R-U comparisons would have been 83.1%,
70.0%, and 64.4%, instead of 78.6%, 69.4%, and 60.0%,
respectively. It is also interesting to see that mean confi-
dence was lower for the “inconsistent” decisions than for
the “consistent” decisions. This reduction, however, was
not sufficient to compensate for the lower percentage cor-
rect, and so overconfidence was far more pronounced for
the “inconsistent” than for the “consistent” decisions.
3.3.4 Effects of (recognition) knowledge on validities
How do participants’ estimates of the validities for the
various comparison types relate to the corresponding per-
centages of correct decisions? Before answering this
question, I extend the list of variables by adding what I
refer to here as simulated validities, that is, the percent-
ages of correct inferences for all possible comparisons of
cities within a given type of comparison (K-U, K-R, and
R-U), given that a participant always decided in favor of
the first city (K, K, and R, respectively). These variables
obviously had to be computed separately for each partic-
ipant. Table 4 contains the values of the six variables,
averaged across all 60 participants. The consistency of
the pattern revealed in Table 4 is striking. Within each
of the three heterogeneous comparison types, both the
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Table 4: Estimated and simulated validity, mean confidence, percentage correct, estimated percentage correct, and
overconfidence for the three heterogeneous comparison types, separated according to size of reference class.
Estimated
validity
Simulated
validity
Mean
confidence
Percentage
correct
Estimated
PC Overconfidence
K-U Largest 75 70.5 87.5 75.1 80.0 64.6 −4.8
Largest 32 75.6 78.4 85.4 68.5 68.7 16.8
K-R Largest 75 59.8 74.5 73.5 71.5 60.8 2.0
Largest 32 68.5 68.9 78.2 67.2 64.6 10.9
R-U Largest 75 61.4 70.1 60.9 65.0 50.5 −4.1
Largest 32 63.8 60.6 65.8 55.9 55.4 9.9
simulated validity and percentage correct are higher for
the large reference class (75 cities) than for the small one
(32 cities). Across all these comparison types and across
these two variables (simulated validity and PC), the av-
erage for the 75 largest cities exceeds that for the largest
32 cities by 8.2 percentage points. Interestingly, partic-
ipants were obviously not aware of this relationship. To
the contrary, their estimated validities, their mean confi-
dence, and their estimated percentage correct all pointed
in the opposite direction: Each of these values was larger
for the reduced reference class. Averaged across all com-
parison types and all these three variables, the difference
was −5.4 percentage points.
It is also interesting to see that in each of the six rows in
Table 4, the simulated validity exceeded percentage cor-
rect. Note that the values for these two measures would
have been the same, had all participants always chosen in
favor of the K-city and the R-city in cases in which such
cities have been paired with an U-city, and in favor of the
K-city in cases in which it has been compared with a R-
city. However, as was explained above, this was not the
case and so the findings reported in Table 4 mirror those
reported in Table 3.
3.3.5 Effects of the size of the reference class on
recognition judgments
The last analysis of these data reported here concerns the
question of whether recognition judgments were indepen-
dent of the size of the reference class (for more results,
see Hoffrage, 1995). According to range-frequency the-
ory (Parducci, 1965), which posits that people have a ten-
dency to map the range of an attribute’s levels linearly
onto the range of the response scale, one may suspect
that this may not be the case. Specifically, having rel-
atively few K-cities in the larger reference class or rel-
atively few unrecognized cities in the smaller reference
class may lead one to shift the criterion that is used to
make these classifications. Conversely, having relatively
more U-cities in the larger reference class and relatively
more K-cities in the smaller reference may lead to cor-
responding criterion shifts in the other direction. Even
though Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) conceptualized
recognition as a simple dichotomous variable—a city is
either recognized or not—others discussed the possibil-
ity that the process of making such categorical judgments
may draw on some more continuous representations in
memory which, in turn, open the theoretical possibility of
context effects on threshold settings (Erdfelder, Küpper-
Tetzel, & Mattern, 2011; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987;
Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; Pleskac,
2007; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005).
In fact, recognition judgments in this experiment did
depend on the size of the reference class. The most
straightforward way to see this is to compare the recog-
nition judgments of the largest 32 cities to those of the
same cities, but now as a subset that is embedded in the
set of the largest 75 cities (henceforth referred to as 32-
in-75). Without any context effects, the recognition judg-
ments should not differ between the two sets (that con-
tain, after all, exactly the same cities). Table 5 displays
the absolute and relative frequencies of the three knowl-
edge states, depending on the size of the reference class.
It is interesting to see that in the population of the largest
32 and of the largest 75 cities, virtually the same percent-
age of cities was categorized as “more knowledge beyond
name recognition”, 34.0 and 32.8, respectively. As a nec-
essary consequence, for the 32-in-75 cities, this percent-
age increased dramatically, from about a third, to more
than half. The criterion shift was expected to be in the
other direction for the unrecognized cities, and this was
the case; the percentage of U-cities decreased by almost
a factor of two and fell from about 20% (32 largest cities)
to about 10% (32-in-75).
As a necessary consequence, the frequency distribution
of the type of comparisons was quite different for the set
of the largest 32 cities and the 32-in-75 set (Table 6).
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Table 5: Frequency distributions of recognition judgments as a function of the size of the reference class. 32-in-75
refers to the set of the largest 32 cities when they were presented to the participants embedded in the set of the largest
75 cities, but were later analyzed separately.
Reference class Frequencies Relative frequencies
K R U K R U
75 739 839 672 32.8 37.3 29.9
32-in-75 521 341 98 54.3 35.5 10.2
32 326 448 186 34.0 46.7 19.4
Table 6: Relative frequency distribution of the six city-comparison types, depending on the size of the reference class
(for an explanation of 32-in-75, see Table 5).
Reference class Homogeneous types Heterogeneous types
K-K R-R U-U K-U K-R R-U
Largest 75 8.1 16.7 10.7 15.7 25.7 23.1
32-in-75 17.3 19.7 1.6 9.1 43.8 8.4
Largest 32 8.6 21.7 8.6 12.1 28.6 20.5
This leads to the interesting question of whether these
context effects on the recognition judgments affected the
confidence, percentage correct, or overconfidence. The
following rationale makes it clear why this may be the
case. We have seen that the set of the largest 32 cities
when presented alone, compared to analyzing the 32-in-
75 set, led to a stricter criterion for a city to be classified
as a K-city, and to a more liberal criterion to classify a city
as a U-city (see also Table 6). Moreover, we have seen
that the validities (be it of the recognition heuristic or, by
an extension of the argument, those of other cues) were
higher for the larger reference class than for the smaller
one. In fact, the percentage of correct inferences for the
set of the largest 75 cities, the embedded set (32-in-75)
and the set of the largest 32 cities were 68.5%, 67.2%,
and 61.7%, respectively.
3.4 Discussion
All of the predictions were basically confirmed. The dis-
crimination rate affected percentage correct, mean confi-
dence, and overconfidence as predicted: The more often
the recognition heuristic could be applied and the more
often other knowledge discriminated among the cities,
the higher the percentage correct and mean confidence
were. These effects could be fully accounted for by the
relative frequencies of the six comparison types. The
percentage of participants’ choices that were consistent
with the prediction of the recognition heuristic is in the
same range as reported in other studies that were con-
ducted later (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). What
the present study adds to the literature is the observation
that, for a larger reference class (all cities above 200,000
inhabitants) as compared to a smaller reference class (all
cities above 400,000 inhabitants), percentage correct was
higher, mean confidence was lower, and overconfidence
was less pronounced. To the best of my knowledge, such
effects have not been reported elsewhere. Equally impor-
tant is the related finding that participants were not only
unaware of the dependency of the validity of the recog-
nition and other knowledge on reference class size, but
also that their answers even pointed in the opposite di-
rection (higher confidence judgments and frequency es-
timates for the smaller reference class). Finally, what
the present study adds to the literature is the conjecture
that recognition judgments might best be seen as resulting
from mapping an underlying hypothetical variable with
the help of a response function onto a dichotomous recog-
nition value. Such a view could, at least, easily account
for the fact that the observed recognition judgments de-
pended, in a between-participants comparison, on the size
of the reference class.
4 General discussion
The present paper reported three studies. The first, paving
the way to the recognition heuristic, was a failed attempt
to generate hard questions by asking German students
which of two U.S. cities (each randomly drawn from a
defined reference class) has more inhabitants. To our
surprise, German students were about as good at these
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questions as they were at the corresponding comparisons
among German cities. In Experiment 2, a similar at-
tempt succeeded: When comparing two representative
item sets, one hard and the other easy, the hard-easy
effect was still observed (higher overconfidence for the
hard set), but now the effect was much smaller than in
previous studies. These two data points fit perfectly into
the larger picture that Juslin, Winman, and Olsson (2000)
provided in their meta-analysis in which they analyzed
the effect of sampling procedure. Specifically, those au-
thors conducted a review of 95 independent data sets with
selected items and 35 sets in which items had been sam-
pled representatively. Across all selected item sets, over-
confidence was 10%, and across all representative sets it
was 1% (95% confidence intervals for each set were at
±1%). Juslin et al. pointed out that this difference could
not be explained by differences in percentage correct.
Moreover, when they controlled for the end effects of the
confidence scale and the linear dependence between per-
centage correct and the overconfidence score (recall that
OC=MC-PC), the hard-easy effect virtually disappeared
for the representative item sets.
4.1 The recognition heuristic: Compen-
satory or non-compensatory?
The focus of the present paper was on the recognition
heuristic, which was proposed as a post-hoc explanation
for the puzzling result of Experiment 1. Two of the major
results of Experiment 3 were, first, that people’s choices
were consistent with the recognition heuristic in about
80% of the pairs when they had no additional knowl-
edge about the recognized city (and in about 90% when
there was such knowledge), and, second, that discrimina-
tion rates drive percentage correct, mean confidence and
overconfidence. As of today, almost 20 years after this
study was conducted, readers might say “we knew that
all along”, and rightly so, as many similar findings have
been reported since then (for overviews see Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, &
Goldstein, in press). However, the literature on the recog-
nition heuristic also reveals some controversies. Some
papers (e.g., Bröder, 2000; Chater, Oaksford, & Nakisa,
2003; Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008)
criticize some aspects and raise some doubts concerning
the research program in which the recognition heuristic
is embedded, namely the simple heuristics program initi-
ated by the ABC Research Group (Gigerenzer, Todd, and
the ABC Research Group, 1999) in general. Space and
the focus of this special issue do not allow such criticism
to be addressed here (but see, e.g., Todd, Gigerenzer, and
the ABC Research Group, 2000; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, &
Goldstein, 2008).
Among those criticisms that refer to the recognition
heuristic specifically, one is particularly interesting as
it directly relates to a distinction already made in the
present Experiment 3. Several authors (e.g., Bröder &
Eichler, 2006; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; 2009; Newell & Fer-
nandez, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Oppenheimer,
2003; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008; Pohl, 2006;
Richter & Späth, 2006) have challenged Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s (2002) claim that people use recognition
knowledge in a non-compensatory fashion. Most of the
studies reported by those authors distinguished between
objects that participants recognized but for which they
had no additional knowledge (in the present paper re-
ferred to as R-objects) and objects which they recognized
and for which they had further knowledge (K-objects).
Hilbig and Pohl (2008), for instance, referred to these ob-
jects as mR (for mere recognition) and R+ (for recogni-
tion plus knowledge), respectively. Some of these au-
thors then developed and used measures beyond those
used in the analyses reported above, like various parame-
ters in a multinomial model approach (Hilbig, Erdfelder,
& Pohl, 2010), response times (Hilbig & Pohl, 2009), or
the DI (Discrimination Index; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008); for
an overview, see Hilbig (2010). The overall conclusion
of these authors is that their data conflict with the hy-
pothesis that recognition knowledge is always used in a
non-compensatory way.
Some of these authors would probably also interpret
some of the results reported in the present paper as incon-
sistent with the non-compensatory nature of the recogni-
tion heuristic. For instance, the finding in Experiment
2 that percentage correct is substantially larger for K-U
pairs than for R-U pairs is consistent with the assump-
tion that the knowledge that was available for K-cities has
been used in some way. Another example would be the
DI (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008), which is defined as the adher-
ence rate to the recognition heuristic among paired com-
parisons in which the recognized object was the correct
answer minus the adherence rate among those compar-
isons for which the recognized object was the incorrect
answer. In their studies, Hilbig and Pohl found this index
to be positive and concluded that the recognition heuris-
tic is not used in a non-compensatory way. The ratio-
nale for this conclusion is that a positive index “would not
be possible through following the recognition cue alone”
(Hilbig & Pohl, 2008, p. 395)—simply because follow-
ing the recognition cue alone yields adherence rates of
100%, both for cases in which the recognition heuristic
would lead to a correct and an incorrect inference, which,
in turn, would yield a difference of zero.5
The DI for Experiment 3 can be recovered from the in-
formation displayed in Table 3. Across all participants
5Note that even if the adherence rate is below 100%, the DI would
still be zero as long as the percentage of choosing the recognized object
is independent of whether the recognized alternative is correct or not.
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and items, it was .055 (the average of the participant-
specific DIs was .053, with SD = .184, SE = .024, which
was significantly greater than 0, t58 = 2.22, p = .02, and it
was positive, zero, negative, and not defined for 30, 6, 23,
and 1 participants, respectively). Among R-U compar-
isons, DI = .031 (the average across participant-specific
DIs was .041, SD = .242, SE = .032, t58 = 1.3, p = .10,
with 25, 7, 27, and 1 participants who had a positive,
zero, negative, and undefined score, respectively) and
among K-U comparisons, DI = .025 (the average across
participant-specific DIs was .032, SD = .277, SE = .041,
t45 = .77, p = .22, with 9, 21, 16, and 14 participants,
respectively). Even though the DI in Experiment 3 was
positive, it was lower than for other studies reported in
the literature (e.g., Hilbig & Pohl, 2008), and the differ-
ence from zero was only significant when R-U and K-U
comparisons were pooled (but for none of these compar-
ison types separately). Moreover, DIK-U did not exceed
DIR-U. To the extent that a positive DI reflects the use of
knowledge beyond recognition, one should have expected
to see that DIK-U > DIR-U, because for K-U comparisons
more knowledge can be used than for R-U comparisons.
Some findings of Experiment 3 are in line with
those reported by authors who have challenged the non-
compensatory nature of the recognition heuristic. Not
only the DI (which includes adherence rates conditioned
on whether the recognized object is the correct answer),
but also Table 3 (which reported percentage correct con-
ditioned on adherence) can be interpreted as evidence in-
consistent with the claim that recognition is always used
in a non-compensatory way. I want to emphasize that I,
just like Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011, p. 110), “have
no doubts that recognition is sometimes dealt with in a
compensatory way”. In fact, if a participant happens to
know that a city she recognizes is very small and rec-
ognized for reasons other than population size (think of
Chernobyl or Fatima), then this would constitute a good
reason not to make an inference based on the recogni-
tion heuristic, but to decide based on what Gigerenzer et
al. (1991) called a local mental model, that is, to use di-
rect knowledge about the criterion. A simple example can
demonstrate that very few cases (5 in 2,000 pairs) like this
are already enough to make a difference between the DI
that was observed in Experiment 3 and a DI of zero.6
6Consider the 20 participants of Experiment 3 for whom the com-
parisons were randomly sampled without any constraints. Across all
20*100 pairs, the recognition heuristic made an inference in 541 pairs,
a correct one in 412 and an incorrect in 129, and choices were consistent
with the recognition heuristic in 367 of 412 (= .891) cases and 110 of
129 (= .853) cases, respectively. Thus, the DI of .038 (= .891−.853) for
these 20 participants was almost the same as the one computed across
all participants, including those for whom the relative frequencies of the
comparison types have been controlled for. Note that a (hypothetical)
adherence rate of .891 (= 115 of 129) among those pairs in which the
recognition heuristic leads to an incorrect inference would have resulted
in DI = 0. However, participants did not choose consistently with the
That recognition knowledge is trumped by criterion
knowledge is one reason why choices may not be con-
sistent with the recognition heuristic. Another reason is
that recognition knowledge could be trumped by prob-
abilistic cues (see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2010).
Experiment 3 of the present paper did not live up to
Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s request to specify models for
such compensatory use of cues against which the non-
compensatory recognition heuristic is tested. One should
not forget, however, that this was the first, exploratory
study on the recognition heuristic, conducted almost 20
years ago, whose goal was to test the post-hoc expla-
nation developed after Experiment 1, rather than to test
specific claims that were formulated only several years
later. While Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein,
& Gigerenzer, G. (2010), who conducted such a rigor-
ous test, conclude from their studies that the recogni-
tion heuristic outperformed all competing compensatory
models with respect to predicting people’s inferences,
Experiment 3 of the present paper did not elicit the data
that are necessary to perform such tests.
The recognition heuristic is a model of cognitive pro-
cesses involved in inferences, and, as every model does,
it simplifies. Therefore, I do not find it at all surprising to
see that people seem to follow the recognition heuristic in
less than 100% of the cases in which it allows for an in-
ference (as reflected in adherence rates < 1) and even less
so if an inference would be incorrect (as reflected in DI >
0). What I do find surprising, though, is that this “failure”
to make correct predictions in 100% of the cases is some-
times seen as critical evidence. This attitude strikes me
as even more surprising when considering that there is no
scarcity of authors in cognitive psychology who seem to
be satisfied if their model predicts outcomes significantly
better than chance.
4.2 The theoretical importance of the (size
of the) reference class
Experiment 3 revealed effects that have not been reported
elsewhere. It is easy to understand why increasing the
size of the reference class increases both the recognition
validity and the validities of cues: adding smaller cities
to a set of larger cities is more likely to result in adding
unrecognized cities than recognized cities, and it is more
likely to result in adding cities with unknown or negative
recognition heuristic in 115 but only in 110 of these 129 cases. As the
Chernobyl example illustrated, there may be good reasons not to use
the recognition heuristic for some of the pairs. Moreover, to the extent
that the local mental models that participants can construct are more
likely to reduce the adherence rate among pairs for which it would be
smart not to use the recognition heuristic, a DI > 0 is not surprising. In
fact, it is only rational to allow criterion knowledge to trump recogni-
tion knowledge (for tests of the potential role of criterion knowledge,
see Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009, and Pachur et al., 2008).
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cue values than with positive cue values. This, in turn,
will not only increase the proportion of pairs consisting of
recognized and unrecognized cities, but also, within this
set, will increase the proportion of pairs in which the rec-
ognized city is the larger one (see the simulated validities
in Table 4). However, it should be mentioned that increas-
ing the size of the reference class also increases the aver-
age difference between the population sizes of the cities
that are compared (see also Juslin et al., 1998). To the ex-
tent that participants possess criterion knowledge (Hilbig,
Pohl, & Bröder, 2009), the increase of percentage correct
(as size of the reference class increases) could also be
explained by a relative increase of comparisons that are
made through the construction of local mental models as
compared to probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer et
al., 1991).
In contrast, participants’ mean confidence revealed an
effect in the opposite direction to that which has been
observed for percentage correct: confidence judgments
were lower for the larger reference class and higher
for the smaller one. Taken together with the effect
on percentage correct, this resulted in zero over/under-
confidence for the larger reference class but in severe
overconfidence for the smaller reference class. Note that
this result was observed in the condition in which the
discrimination rate has not been controlled for and thus
it poses a challenge for PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al.,
1991). At the same time, the effect on confidence judg-
ments is easily explained: It may have resulted from the
fact that the smaller reference class contained relatively
more cities that the participants recognized and also more
cities that they knew something about, coupled with the
(false) belief “the more I know, the better I will perform.”
It is also consistent with the results of many studies con-
ducted by Klaus Fiedler and his colleagues demonstrating
that participants do not appropriately adjust their judg-
ments to the sampling procedure of the items they are
presented with (e.g., Fiedler, 2000).
The insight that both the validities of recognition and
that of other cues depend on the size of the reference
class leads to some interesting questions: Which refer-
ence classes should experimenters select in their studies?
Which reference classes do participants use when they
determine their confidence? The problem of choosing the
adequate reference class is neither trivial nor new. It is,
for instance, fundamental to the frequentistic interpreta-
tion of probabilities (for history and interpretations, see
Gigerenzer et al., 1989). As the great probability theo-
rist Richard von Mises (1957) put it, “we shall not speak
of probability until a collective has been defined” (p. 18).
Insurance companies face the same problem when deter-
mining the premium for a life insurance of a particular
person. Clearly this premium will depend on the prob-
ability that this person will die, say, within the next ten
years. But which of the person’s innumerable proper-
ties should be used to construct a reference population?
Each of these properties (as well as combinations thereof)
could be used to define the reference class, and in all
likelihood, many of the resulting reference classes would
yield different statistics and thus different estimations for
mortality risks, leaving open the question of which is the
correct one.
Frankly, I do not have a good answer. However,
I think there are possible pragmatic routes toward a
“good enough solution” (see also Hoffrage & Hertwig,
2006). Under some circumstances, experimenters may
circumvent the problems that result from fuzzy refer-
ence classes—either by selecting one that is small, finite,
and complete (e.g., all African states) or by creating mi-
croworlds (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2002). This allows them
to control for participants’ exposure to these worlds and
make sure that the intended reference class and the par-
ticipants’ reference class converge. Another possibility
would be to explore the boundaries of a reference class
empirically (e.g., by analyzing environmental frequen-
cies). Anderson and Schooler (1991), for instance, exam-
ined a number of environmental sources (such as the New
York Times) and showed that there are reliable relation-
ships between the probability that a memory for a partic-
ular piece of information will be needed and frequency,
recency, and patterns of prior exposure. Such an anal-
ysis of environmental statistics could also be conducted
in the context of the research reported in this paper. For
the city task, for instance, it may show that people are
much more likely to encounter larger cities than smaller
cities. Specifically, such environmental frequencies could
be used to determine how often a particular city is used
in the experimental materials. Finally, another way to de-
termine the “right” size of people’s reference classes is to
transfer the task of sampling experimental stimuli from
the experimenter to the participants. Hogarth (2005), for
instance, used mobile phones and interrupted his partic-
ipants in their flow of daily activities at randomly cho-
sen intervals and asked several questions regarding the
last decision that they made, thereby letting them, the en-
vironment, and chance determine which environmental
stimuli are designated to become experimental ones (see
also Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004).
4.3 Final remarks
The formulation of the recognition heuristic has led to a
lot of exciting research. However, we should not only
look at what has been achieved in the past, but also con-
tinue this fruitful tradition in the future. Interestingly,
when adopting the recognition heuristic to generate rec-
ommendations for choosing among research topics, it
should be inverted. When faced with the choice between
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working on recognized topics, replicating known find-
ings, versus entering new and unexplored territory: Go
with the latter. I hope the present paper helped to iden-
tify some of these blank areas on the map of research on
the recognition heuristic, thereby initiating some further
steps towards new directions.
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